Human preferences and risky choices. by van Schaik, Paul et al.
University of Huddersfield Repository
van Schaik, Paul, Kusev, Petko and Juliusson, Asgeir
Human preferences and risky choices.
Original Citation
van Schaik, Paul, Kusev, Petko and Juliusson, Asgeir (2011) Human preferences and risky choices. 
Frontiers in Psychology, 2 (333). ISSN 1664­1078 
This version is available at http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/33303/
The University Repository is a digital collection of the research output of the
University, available on Open Access. Copyright and Moral Rights for the items
on this site are retained by the individual author and/or other copyright owners.
Users may access full items free of charge; copies of full text items generally
can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third parties in any
format or medium for personal research or study, educational or not­for­profit
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided:
• The authors, title and full bibliographic details is credited in any copy;
• A hyperlink and/or URL is included for the original metadata page; and
• The content is not changed in any way.
For more information, including our policy and submission procedure, please
contact the Repository Team at: E.mailbox@hud.ac.uk.
http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/
model can completely mimic a multiplicative (“integrative”) model; 
however, even stability of parameter values over time and across 
contexts in the different models does not imply correct model 
identification, as the parameters map onto different psychological 
variables. Betsch argues and provides evidence for the conceptu-
alization of preferences as attitudes, whose stability is determined 
by behavior repetition and processing style. According to Hertwig 
and Gigerenzer, apparent inconsistencies in risky-choice behavior 
can be accounted for by decision-makers’ application of cognitive 
strategies (in particular heuristics) and the interaction of these 
strategies with the environment. Brandstätter contends that elici-
tation method strongly affects people’s choices; people use many 
strategies, one main candidate of which is the priority heuristic. 
Parducci demonstrates that range-frequency theory implies that 
judgments are not stable across contexts; as a result, the search 
for higher utility leads to reduced pleasure. Brown and Matthews 
show that, at least under certain conditions, rank-based models 
and range-based models are equivalent in that both can account 
for apparent range effects.
Yet, still other authors explore arguments for a moderation of 
computational and non-computational processes of decision-mak-
ing by other factors. They highlight the possibility that memory or 
experiences of events leak into decisions even when risk information 
is explicitly provided. In this research topic, Kusev and van Schaik 
argue and provide evidence for the idea that characteristics of (a) 
the decision-making context and (b) content, (c) the decision-maker 
(including cognitive resources and motivation), and (d) presenta-
tion format of task material (for example probability format or 
frequency format) all influence people’s psychological processing 
and subsequent risky choices. It follows then that stable behavioral 
patterns toward risk or the use of (single) psychological strategies 
do not exist. Chater, Johansson, and Hall also argue that people do 
not have risk preferences; rather, risky choices are shaped directly by 
past choices or explanations thereof. Any coherence between choices 
will be limited to those that share superficial features.
Still other researchers provide further accounts for the appar-
ent lack of stability of preferences. In this research topic, Fox and 
Tannenbaum argue that because of four specific conceptual and 
methodological challenges there is still a lack of evidence for sta-
ble and measurable risk preferences. Aldrovandi and van Heussen 
argue that the lack or degree of stability of preference in decision-
making can be explained by psychological phenomena of memory; 
various memory phenomena lead to instability of risk preferences. 
Based on evidence from their neuropsychological brain research, 
Chen, Allen, Deb, and Humphreys argue that emotions can play a 
necessary functional role in decision-making, but as a consequence, 
emotions can alter the stability of the process. According to Dickert 
There are different views on what preferences for risks are and 
whether they are indicators of stable, underlying generic cognitive 
systems. Preferences could be conceived as an attitude toward a set 
of properties of context, memory, and affect – a gage of how much 
uncertainty one is willing to tolerate. One type of computational 
“descriptive” integrative decision-making theories predicts specific 
behavioral patterns of risky preferences. An individual’s risky choice 
among two or more options is considered, where at least one option 
has an uncertain outcome1. Choices are based on the integration of 
probability and utility information into expected utilities, and trade-
off comparisons of computed outcomes. It is assumed that there are 
lawful underlying patterns of risky preferences (e.g., the shapes of 
loss aversion and probability-weighting functions), and that these 
would reflect any relevant constraints in cognitive resources. In this 
spirit, in this research topic, Lebière and Anderson demonstrate that 
their sequence-learning model, reflecting general cognitive processes 
in response to constraints inherent in the task environment, is supe-
rior for modeling risky choice in terms of capturing the stability 
that comes from previous experience. According to Luce, there are 
three inherently different types of people corresponding to their 
values of an additional utility-model parameter representing risk 
preference. Birnbaum demonstrates that the TAX model, in contrast 
to other explanations, accounts for a lack or transitivity in people’s 
choices. Pothos and Busemeyer show that quantum-probability 
theory allows the modeling of decision-making phenomena (e.g., 
the conjunction fallacy and violations of the sure-thing principle), 
which go beyond classic probability theory, because of the con-
text- and order-dependence in quantum-probability assessment. 
Jones and Oaksford provide evidence for a more stable pattern of 
preferences in transactional decision tasks than in gambles. Given 
that hypothetical gambles provide results that are internally incon-
sistent, Baron demonstrates that a monetary-difference choice task 
to measure risk preference is a good indicator of people’s utility 
function for money.
Another type of theory can be considered as “non- 
computational.” These theories argue for processing by establishing 
the role of “experience” in risky decision-making, proposing that 
choices are not based on the utilitarian integration of probability, 
and utility information, and trade-off comparisons of computed 
outcomes. However, yet (again) it is assumed that there are lawful 
underlying patterns of preferences, or people use specific processing 
and decision-making strategies. Stewart’s results of model fitting 
show that, for simple risky choices, an additive (“non-integrative”) 
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and Slovic, research on mental imagery and attention as underly-
ing processes of affective responses and other research showing 
individual differences as moderators of these processes help explain 
why people do not hold stable values for saving human lives. Vlaev 
shows and provides evidence for the idea that trade-off inconsist-
ency is a ubiquitous psychophysical anomaly, in which preferences 
between (pairs of) options are not reliable when the options are 
of the same qualitative type and/or differ on a single dimension. 
Villejoubert and Vallée-Tourangeau argue that the perspective of 
distributed cognition has the potential to provide a new way of 
conceiving of and accounting for the role of the environment in the 
construction of preference; the implication is that preferences may 
be very different when people interact with rather than respond 
to the environment.
In conclusion, the contributions in this research topic offer a 
range of explanations for stability in risky choice. We are looking 
forward to further work that comparatively tests the validity of 
these different explanations and work that integrates approaches 
to provide a better account where this seems is appropriate.
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